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The NCAA’s Historical Challenges with Antitrust
Issues and Its Current Battle for Continued
Relevance
Andrew Bondarowicz
On January 12, 2021, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) delayed what would be the most significant policy shift in the
association in almost 40 years. The proposal would allow student‐
athletes, for the first time, to earn revenue and profit from the use of their
name, image, and likeness (NIL) rights—also known as their rights of
publicity. The delayed vote prolongs the NCAA’s complicated legal dance
with antitrust law, and it also continues the organization’s difficult search
for its modern identity within the bounds of its original mission. The NCAA
also failed to placate its critics who feel that the commercialization of the
NCAA exploits student‐athletes more than it benefits them. So, the drama
continues with a series of internal, congressional, legal, and legislative
proposals seeking to revolutionize the amateur sports behemoth.
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I. Introduction
A. WHAT IS THE NCAA?
The NCAA is a tax-exempt, unincorporated association that
recognizes approximately 1,100 colleges and universities as members.1
It sponsors over 90 championships in 24 different men’s and women’s
sports and claims about half a million student-athletes participating at
the collegiate level.2 The NCAA is governed by its Board of Governors,
while its policy-making body is a series of committees composed of
volunteers from its member schools.3 The NCAA maintains a three-tier
system of divisions for competitions. Division I is considered the most
competitive and allows schools competing at this level to award
students athletics-based scholarships, financial aid, and other benefits
for athletic participation.4 The NCAA maintains maximum scholarship
limits for each sport, although it is up to the individuals schools to
determine how many scholarships they award each year, within the
NCAA limits. 5 Division I includes many of the largest schools in the
country. There are currently 350 schools and over 182,000 studentathletes competing at the Division I level.6 The majority of the
professional players drafted into the major American sports leagues
come from the Division I ranks.7
Division II, like Division I, provides its member schools with the
ability to issue athletics-based financial aid; however, the amount of
1 What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Apr. 10, 2021); see also National Collegiate
Athlete
Association,
Nonprofit
Explorer,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/440567264/20171137934
9300841/IRS990 (last visited July 1, 2021).
2 Id.
3 See Governance, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance (last visited July 1,
2021).
4 See Our Division I Students, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/our-division-i-students
(last visited July 1, 2021).
5 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, OPERATING BYLAWS, 15.01.1 (Aug. 1, 2020),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf.
6 NCAA, RECRUITING FACTS, COLLEGE SPORTS CREATE A PATHWAY TO OPPORTUNITY FOR
STUDENT
ATHLETES
(Aug.
2020),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/recruiting/NCAA_RecruitingFactShee
t.pdf. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
7 See Chip Patterson, 2021 NFL Draft Picks by College Team, CBS, May 1, 2021,
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/2021-nfl-draft-picks-by-collegeteam-school-georgia-leads-sec-on-day-2-notre-dame-and-ohio-state-shine/.
For a
historical analysis of NBA Draft data, see Basketball, NBA Draft Finder, Stathead
Basketball, https://stathead.com/basketball/draft_finder.cgi (last visited July 1, 2021).
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scholarships per sport is lower than Division I.8 Division II schools also
tend to either have smaller enrolled populations and/or dedicate less
resources to athletics than their Division I counterparts.9 Finally,
Division III is the largest division based on the number of schools with
438 members—approximately 40% of the total NCAA membership.10
The NCAA includes an elaborate structure of policy committees that are
mainly composed of administrators with input from various studentathlete groups for generating overall NCAA policy.11 “The NCAA Manual,
published and revised annually, contains the NCAA’s constitution,
bylaws, executive regulations, enforcement procedures, recommended
policies, and rules of order.”12 Additionally, each division also has its
own self-governance and rule-making apparatus.13
There are several principles that are the tenets of the NCAA,
including the “Principle of Amateurism” that requires that studentathletes not be compensated directly for athletic performance.14 This
principle is the key differentiator between college athletics and
professional sports, where professional athletes can be very highly
compensated for their athletic performance. Unlike professional
leagues that have unions that represent the player-workers and
participate in collective bargaining, student-athletes do not have a
formal, direct vote in NCAA policymaking. Instead, NCAA “legislation” is
voted on by its member schools.15
The NCAA was originally formed in the early 1900s to protect the
health and safety of students participating in the emerging sport of
football on campuses across the country. Specifically, the organization
was formed in 1905 in response to a call to action from then-President
Theodore Roosevelt to the university presidents of Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton, to address the mounting injuries—and even deaths—in

8 See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020); NCAA, DIVISION II MANUAL, (Aug. 1,
2020; NCAA, DIVISION III MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020).
9 See About Division II, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d2 (last
visited July 1, 2021).
10 Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Apr. 10, 2021). Jeff K. Brown,
Compensation for the Student‐Athlete: Preservation of Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
147, 148 (1996).
11 See Governance, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance/ (last visited July 1, 2021).
12 Brown, supra note 10.
13 See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020); NCAA, DIVISION II MANUAL, (Aug. 1,
2020; NCAA, DIVISION III MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020).
14 NCAA,
DIVISION I MANUAL, CONSTITUTION, 2.9
(Aug.
1,
2020),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf.
15 Id. at 3.2.1.7.1.
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football among colleges around the country.16 A number of prominent
schools banded together to charter an organization known as the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States, which was later
renamed to its present name in 1910.17 From the beginning, the NCAA’s
charge was to unilaterally protect the health and safety of students
competing in intercollegiate athletics by creating standards and
regulations to curb injuries and deaths in connection with participation
in intercollegiate sports.18 The NCAA remained small as a governing
organization—it did not hire its first full-time employee until 1951—but
mushroomed to over 500 employees today.19 Throughout its history,
the NCAA has remained a private, non-governmental self-regulatory
association. However, as the complexity of college athletics grew and
evolved, so have the NCAA’s scope and breadth of responsibility.
As the popularity of college athletics grew, the negative influences
of competition led to calls for more oversight to ensure fair competition.
The desire to win on the field drove schools to recruit high-level athletes
and began to offer financial incentives in the form of academic aid to
individuals to lure students to their institutions so they would compete
for the schools.20 In response, the NCAA established its first set of
recruiting and financial aid rules in the late 1950s.21 At the time, the
rules were very strict and limited the ability of schools to provide
incentives to prospective student-athletes.22 These restraints were only
intended to maintain the member-schools academic mission by
disallowing financial windfalls from sports drive students’ school
selection decisions.
However, that did not stop schools from seeking a competitive
advantage in other ways. In University of Denver v. Nemeth,23 a former
student sued for workers compensation when he suffered a back injury
while participating for the school’s intercollegiate football team,
16

Jim Weathersby, Teddy Roosevelt’s Role in the Creation of the NCAA, THE SPORTS
HISTORIAN (July 6, 2016), https://www.thesportshistorian.com/teddy-roosevelts-rolein-the-creation-of-the-ncaa/#.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See National Office Leadership Team, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/whowe-are/office-president/ncaa-senior-leadership-team (last visited July 1, 2021).
20 John
Kibilko,
The
History
of
Sports
Scholarships,
SAPLING,
https://www.sapling.com/8144923/history-sports-scholarships (last visited July 1,
2021).
21 Id.
22 Andy Staples, A History of Recruiting; How Coaches Have Stayed a Step Ahead,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(June
23,
2008),
https://www.si.com/moresports/2008/06/23/recruiting-main.
23 University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
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preventing him from fulfilling his duties as an on-campus maintenance
worker, an arrangement that helped provide access to school and secure
his participation in football.24 Nemeth prevailed in showing that the
school routinely arranged employment for athletes and, therefore,
participating in football was part of his job duties to the university.25
This led the NCAA to coin the term “student-athlete,” add it to their
bylaws, and draw a distinction between a student participating in
intercollegiate athletics from anything else they may do on campus,
including employment.26 It also clarified that student-athletes were not
being compensated for athletic participation.27
B. WHERE DOES THE NCAA FIT IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SPORTS
LANDSCAPE?
In the United States, the sports hierarchy is very disjointed. There
are a variety of organizations that are involved in the regulation and
organization of sports programs, from purely recreational activities
through to professional level competitions. While there are established
norms in the development process of each sport, the succession plan for
an athlete to ascend to higher levels in a particular sport can vary
immensely from one sport to another, and meander through a collection
of organizations. At best, these organizations are loosely connected and,
in some cases, they are not connected at all.
Purely recreational programs are generally run by non-profit
organizations, social clubs, schools, or government agencies. Their
intention is to provide children, and even adults, with an opportunity for
physical activity, education, and pure recreation. Generally, organized
sports, are governed either directly or indirectly, by nonprofit national
governing organizations,28 or by national governing bodies (NGBs) that
are often affiliated with the United States Olympic and Paralympic
Committee. There may also be intermediary organizational levels, such
as state or regional associations or leagues that help administer
competition. These intervening organizations include the YMCA and the
Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) network are major organizers for sports
such as swimming or gymnastics and track and field or basketball,
respectively. For most of these sports, the pinnacle of their sports
24

Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 430.
26 Former NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers is credited with coining the term
“student-athlete” in 1964.
27 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, Principal of Amateurism, (Aug. 1, 2020).
28 Federal tax law provides tax exemption for amateur athletics. See 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3) (exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc.).
25
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competition pyramid ends with the Olympics or world championships
where the top athletes are able to represent their country in athletic
competition.
Separately, educational institutions run their own athletic
structure. While elementary and middle school programs are typically
run locally, high school sports are typically administered through
statewide athletic organizations that provide governance, organization,
and administer championship events.29 While most state organizations
belong to the National Federation of High School Associations which
provides some support and coordination amongst members, each state
typically administers its own competitive programs. 30 High school
sports tend to function independently from the national governing
sports bodies in many sports, such as soccer and basketball, and create
different rules for high school competition versus non-high school
competition.31 In other sports, such as football, baseball, and softball,
that are not aligned with the United States Olympic & Paralympic
Committee (USOPC), high school rules are often independently
developed and align informally to the sport’s “norms.”32 In many of
these sports, the rules of play vary at different levels without a cohesive
central governing body.
The role of professional sports leagues in athletic development
varies greatly in the United States. The National Hockey League and
Major League Baseball maintain several levels of “minor leagues” where
promising athletes can be developed to determine if they have what it
takes to reach the major league level.33 The National Basketball
Association recently started to develop the NBA G-League as their
official developmental league.34 While there is a growing trend of the
top high school players bypassing college competition for the G-League,
this has been very limited to date.35 Instead, the majority of G-League
players are former college players who were not able to make NBA
rosters, yet are still aspiring to do so. Major League Soccer (MLS) has
the most extensive player development process with their “academy”

29 About
Us,
NATIONAL
FEDERATION
OF
HIGH
SCHOOL
ASSOCIATIONS,
https://www.nfhs.org/who-we-are/aboutus (last visited April 10, 2021).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Official Release, NBA G League Introduces New Professional Path for Elite
Basketball Prospect (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nba.com/news/g-leagueprofessional-path-official-release.
35 Id.
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structure extending down to pre-teen ages.36 The NFL has almost no
role in the developmental process. It does not maintain a minor league
nor are there internal pathways for youth athletes to the professional
ranks. Instead, they rely on the college ranks to develop their talent for
them. By comparison, European soccer clubs maintain an integrated
structure from the youth level to the professional ranks. While most
youth sports in the United States maintain a “pay to play” system,
European clubs usually have low or no cost youth programs where they
instead look to garner development fees from other clubs who sign their
developed talent to professional contracts.37
NCAA sports align most closely with other education-based sports
programs, such as high school athletics, and create a unique character
to college sports. The NCAA create its own eligibility and recruiting
rules and maintain their own unique rules of competition. For example,
pass interference and time management rules in NCAA football are
different than similar rules in the NFL. College basketball games are 40
minutes, broken into two 20-minute halves, while NBA games run 48
minutes and are played in 12-minute quarters. NCAA rules in other
sports can also vary from rules in non-NCAA competition. Like high
school sports, college athletes are not paid for their participations and
are thus considered amateur athletes. Yet, the unique nature of college
sports does not limit their popularity and ability to generate revenue.
For example, college football programs broadcast more games in total
per week than the NFL.38
The NCAA also plays a vital role in player development. For the
NFL, almost all of their new talent each season emerges from the college
ranks through the draft process. NFL draft rules require an aspiring
player to be at least three years removed from high school or at least
twenty years of age to be eligible to be drafted.39 That leaves players
with few options other than to play college football. The NBA also has a
similar draft rule although their rule only requires one year of post-high
36 Associated Press, MLS Unveils New Youth Development Plan After U.S. Soccer
Shutters
Academy
Program,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/05/14/mls-youth-academy-developmentprogram-us-soccer.
37 Id.
38 The National Football League is composed of thirty-two teams playing games once
per week. There are over 130 NCA Division I Bowl Subdivision teams also playing
weekly. Almost all FBS games are broadcast through lineal or streaming services
through various contracts and broadcasting arrangements.
39 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the National Football League
and the National Football League Players Association, at 34 (2020), available at
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/website/PDFs/CBA/March-15-2020-NFLNFLPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement-Final-Executed-Copy.pdf.
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school development and at least nineteen years of age.40 The Women’s
National Basketball League (WNBA) requires draft prospects to be at
least twenty-two years old during the calendar year in which such Draft
is held and have either completed their college degree or have
renounced any remaining intercollegiate eligibility.41 Participating in
college football and basketball allows players to mature physically, hone
their athletic skills, and also gain name recognition, before they become
eligible for professional drafts. For athletes in many Olympic sports,
college competition provides enhanced training and coaching, access to
facilities, and a team environment for athletes to continue competing in
their sports. Collegiate level-sports is often the highest level of
competition available to many athletes who do not qualify for national
teams in sports such as swimming, rowing, or gymnastics.
In the majority of the twenty-four NCAA-sponsored sports, athletes
often toil in relative obscurity without major televised appearances,
media, or other recognition. Even the top competitors in most of these
sports are largely anonymous to the general public. Conversely, a few
NCAA-sponsored sports—namely football and basketball—receive
significant marketing and public relations support such that many of the
sports’ top athletes enjoy higher name recognition than many
professional athletes in their sports. These sports generate millions of
dollars in revenue from lucrative television contracts and live
attendance. As a result, NCAA schools pour millions into marketing,
upgrading facilities, and promoting these particular sports to drive
attendance and recruit the best athletes in a self-perpetuating cycle.42
The success of college football and basketball has also brought
significant criticism because generated revenues are not shared with
the players in the same way they are in professional sports leagues. In
professional leagues, collective bargaining forces a certain percentage
of league revenues to flow to the players in the form of salary and
benefits.

40 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the National Basketball
Association and the National Basketball Players Association, at 273 (2017), available at
https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBANBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf.
41 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the Woman’s National
Basketball Association and the Woman’s National Basketball Players Association, at 110
(2020), available at https://wnbpa.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WNBAWNBPA-CBA-2020-2027.pdf.
42 See David Ridpath, Who Actually Funds Intercollegiate Athletic Programs?, FORBES
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ccap/2014/12/12/who-actuallyfunds-intercollegiate-athletic-programs/?sh=3277fb0f17af.
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The distribution of revenues in college sports versus professional
leagues is another major difference that separates them. In professional
domestic leagues, the business model is singularly focused around a
single team competing in a single sport. So, the constituents are very
easy to establish for the distribution of revenues – players and
management. Conversely, colleges face a much different challenge.
College athletic departments are organized as nonprofit entities,
therefore, private inurement is prohibited. There are no “owners” or
“shareholders” and, likewise, the concept of revenue-sharing is not
possible in the same way it is in the professional leagues. Instead,
revenues beyond those needed to run the business are redistributed
across a school’s entire athletic program. Currently, the NCAA requires
each school competing at the Division I level to maintain a minimum of
sixteen teams.43 Title IX requires that schools receiving any form of
federal funding offer athletic opportunities to both men and women in
proportion to the gender balance at each school.44 These two
requirements limit some of the business decisions that schools can
make for themselves by forcing a broader dispersal of revenues than a
typical professional team. In fact, most NCAA schools are dependent on
subsidies from their universities, donations from sponsors, and student
fees to alleviate budget deficits.45
The complexity of the sports landscape does not provide a clear
answer on whether NCAA sports more closely resemble professional or
amateur sports organizations. Competitively, it can be argued that
college sports are intended to be competitions organized for amateurs;
however, the revenue generating potential of college sports makes it
difficult to view it as purely “amateur.” So, the debate shifts to whether
NCAA athletics should be viewed as commercial activity – like
professional leagues – or more like their not-for-profit brethren.

43 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, (Aug. 1, 2020). See also Preparing for Budget Crunch, Five
Conferences Ask NCAA for Relief, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 15, 2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/04/15/ncaa-conferences-coronavirus-pandemicimpact.
44 Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir.1993).
45 See
Finances
of
Intercollegiate
Athletics,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics
(last visited July 1, 2021).
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II. The Rise of Antitrust Claims in Professional Sports
A. HISTORY OF NCAA AND ANTITRUST
Professional sports have been subject to antitrust scrutiny since
the early 1900s. Federal Baseball Club v. National League 46 provided
professional baseball with a shield from antitrust by classifying baseball
as an “exhibition” and not actual interstate commerce.47 The Federal
Baseball Club decision protected the industry of professional baseball
from antitrust scrutiny for decades, particularly in the area of labor
relations.48 Baseball was able to restrict the freedom of players to
change teams/employers at the expiration of their employment
contracts through a concept known as the “reserve clause.”49 The
reserve clause was challenged in Flood v. Kuhn,50 although the Supreme
Court leaned on stare decisis and cited Federal Baseball Club in its
opinion.51 Flood became the watershed case that gave rise to the power
and influence of organized labor in professional sports. The Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was officially recognized
as a union in 1966.52 While the MLBPA never overcame the precedent
of Federal Baseball Club, the sport suffered through numerous labor
stoppages over the next forty years.53
Other professional sports leagues were not as lucky in avoiding
antitrust scrutiny. In 1956, the National Football League (NFL) was first
exposed to antitrust scrutiny.54 Bill Radovich, an offensive lineman who
played for the NFL’s Detroit Lions, bucked the NFL when he decided to
join the Los Angeles Dons of the rival All-America Football Conference
46

Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
Id. at 209.
48 A number of labor and employment challenges were waged against Major League
Baseball after the Court’s decision in Federal Baseball. The courts have cited the
precedent set in that case on many occasions. See Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et. al. 407
U.S. 258.
49 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 (1972).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 290.
52 The History of Baseball Unionization: The MLBPA Before it was the MLBPA, MARC
NORMANDIN (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.marcnormandin.com/2020/10/16/thehistory-of-baseball-unionization-the-mlbpa-before-it-was-the-mlbpa/.
53 Nick Selbe, This Day in Sports History: MLB Players Go on Their First Strike, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (April 1, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/04/01/this-day-historymlb-players-strike
mlbpa#:~:text=In%20the%20long%20history%20of%20Major%20League%20Baseb
all%2C,from%20Aug.%2067.%20Others%20have%20been%20more%20consequential.
54 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957).
47
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(AAFC).55 He was subsequently “blacklisted” from returning to
employment with any NFL-affiliated teams and filed suit.56 In Radovich
v. National Football League,57 the Supreme Court determined that the
NFL constituted a business under American antitrust laws but did not
enjoy the same antitrust protection as Major League Baseball.58
Meanwhile, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
gained momentum amongst players around the same time and was
officially recognized as the bargaining unit in 1956.59 The burgeoning
union made small inroads in its representation of NFL players until
work stoppages in the 1980s and 1990s solidified its standing in labor
negotiations.60
On the business front, the NFL also faced antitrust scrutiny in its
televised broadcasting of games. The NFL, unlike other professional
sports leagues at the time, relied on the pooling of broadcasting rights
among its members to offer networks a collective bundle of rights.61
This arrangement was viewed as anticompetitive; however, the NFL
was successfully able to lobby Congress for the passage of the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961, which provided a limited antitrust
exemption.62 This Act was also a catalyst in clearing the way for the
merger of the American Football League and the National Football
League into the NFL we know today.63
B. THE NCAA’S CHALLENGES WITH ANTITRUST ISSUES
Until the 1970s the education-based institutions that were part of
the NCAA were viewed more like high school sports than professional
sports despite the growing revenue that was driven largely by live

55

Id. at 448.
Id.
57 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957).
58 Id. at 447-48, 452.
59 See Our History of Wins, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION,
https://nflpa.com/about/history (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
60 See
NFL Labor History Since 1968, ESPN.COM (Mar. 3, 2011),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history.
61 The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 was passed in response to a court decision
which ruled that the NFL’s method of negotiating television broadcasting rights violated
antitrust laws. See United States of America v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445;
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2018).
62 See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2018).
63 The two leagues were considered rivals previously and subject to antitrust
scrutiny otherwise. See Cecilia Kang, How the Government Helps the NFL Maintain its
Power
and
Profitability,
WASH.
POST,
(Sept.
16,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2014/09/16/how-thegovernment-helps-the-nfl-maintain-its-power-and-profitability/.
56
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attendance. As the importance of television as a broadcasting medium
grew in the 1940s and 1950s, the NCAA largely eschewed broadcasting
rights for its membership as it was viewed as a threat to live attendance
revenue that almost all NCAA members relied upon.64 In 1953, the
NCAA began to offer a very restrictive package of televised games that
allowed only one televised game per week, did not allow a school to play
in more than one televised game per season, and required all members
of the NCAA to share in the revenue.65 The NCAA used its central role in
collegiate sports to drive compliance from its members.
Despite increasingly restrictive rules in its control of television
rights, the NCAA was largely spared from antitrust scrutiny until the
1970s. In 1979, the College Football Association (CFA), an association
of sixty-four football-playing universities, challenged the NCAA’s
monopoly on negotiating television rights on behalf of member schools
by negotiating its own rights deal.66 In response, the NCAA sought to
impose sanctions against the schools that participated in the CFA deal.67
The sanctions were met with a suit brought by the University of Georgia
and University of Oklahoma in the case that became known as Board of
Regents v. NCAA.68 In this case, the University of Georgia and University
of Oklahoma sued the NCAA claiming the association’s restrictions on
schools’ rights to unfettered televised broadcasting of college football
games was an unlawful restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman
Act and United States antitrust laws.69 The NCAA countered the
allegations with a “rule of reason” affirmative defense, claiming that
limiting an individual school’s ability to appear on television and
controlling the overall supply of televised games benefits members by
encouraging live attendance at games and providing more schools with
the opportunity to appear on television.70
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.71 This ruling
essentially rendered the NCAA powerless and irrelevant in the
expansion of televised college football and ultimately the tremendous
growth and commercialization of college sports, namely football and
basketball.72 This holding also sparked a power shift from the NCAA to
the CFA to negotiate broadcasting deals with networks, thereby
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1984).
Id. at 90, 92–94.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S., at 113-115.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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decentralizing power. Conferences were the beneficiaries as their role
as aggregators of media rights for a smaller subset of schools provided
an opportunity to establish conference-based networks such as the Big
Ten Network and SEC Network.
As the revenue from increased television exposure has grown since
the 1980s, it has created a significant amount of upheaval within the
NCAA. Schools started to shift allegiances from their conference
alliances, creating widespread realignment that was based more on
revenue opportunities rather than regional rivalries and other
synergies that were the traditional basis for conference membership.
C. THE NCAA’S CURRENT ANTITRUST BATTLE GROUND
While the NCAA’s loss in Board of Regents created an entirely new
economic landscape in college athletics, it also opened the NCAA up to
additional challenges on antitrust grounds by other constituencies. In
response, some courts have provided some level of protection for the
NCAA and its ability to regulate college athletics—including
amateurism—while not limiting its ability to curtail economic activity
within its enterprise.
In addition to the challenges accompanying the Board of Regents
ruling, the NCAA faced another major challenge to its authority to
regulate college football. Rumors concerning Southern Methodist
University (SMU), one of the top college football teams in the mid-1980s,
began to surface concerning impermissible benefits, including cash,
provided by boosters to SMU’s current players and potential recruits.
These payments were intended to retain top players and allow SMU to
stay on top of their sport.73 The egregious and repeated violations of the
NCAA’s amateurism rules led to the “death penalty” for SMU’s football
program as it was unable to compete in 1987 and 1988.74 In response,
SMU alumni filed suit against the NCAA challenging its authority to
sanction the school by cancelling it’s 1987 season. In McCormack v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Assoc.,75 the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA’s
suspension of SMU’s football program for violation of its amateurism
rules, which prevented student-athletes from being compensated, was
a violation of the Sherman Act. 76 In this Fifth Circuit opinion, the Court
struck down this challenge to the NCAA and provided some protection
for amateurism.77 The Court reasoned that the restrictions imposed by
73
74
75
76
77

Mark Asher, NCAA Cancels SMU’s 1987 Football, WASH. POST, (Feb. 26, 1987).
Id.
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1340.
Brown, supra note 10, at 149 (citing McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340).
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amateurism protected the “special product” that college athletics is from
the increasing commercialization pressures that were starting to engulf
college sports.78
Another challenge to the NCAA’s authority actually pre-dated the
SMU case, although the Supreme Court did not rule on the issue until
1988. In 1977, the NCAA investigated the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (“UNLV”), for questionable recruiting practices involving their
head coach Jerry Tarkanian.79 Tarkanian was an outspoken critic of the
NCAA’s regulatory regime dating back to his time as head coach at his
previous school, Long Beach State in California, where he was also
sanctioned.80 Tarkanian was sanctioned at Long Beach State for
compliance issues and for criticizing the NCAA for being lenient with
large schools while it instead “picked on” smaller schools that did not
have the resources to fight against it.81 The NCAA levied sanctions
against UNLV and the school bowed into the pressure and promptly
suspended Tarkanian for two seasons.82 Tarkanian filed suit against the
NCAA in Nevada state court.83 The NCAA challenged the injunction in a
case that eventually was argued before the Supreme Court.84 The
Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA was not a state actor, and thus was
not subject to the same sort of due process requirements as a
governmental agency.85 The NCAA was not found to be sufficiently
entangled with state universities, nor was it found that UNLV, a public
university, delegated enough authority to the NCAA to make the
association a state actor.86
In the wake of the Tarkanian case, the State of Nevada passed a law
which attempted to force the NCAA to provide additional due process
protections to institutions, coaches, and student-athletes in Nevada.87
The law also prevented the NCAA from retaliating against Nevada

78

Brown, supra note 10.
See Tarkanian v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987) for
procedural history. This long standing litigation grew out of an initial investigation by
the NCAA in the UNLV basketball program and its head coach’s recruiting activity.
80 See Case Decision Against Long Beach State, Legislative Database for Major
Infractions,
NCAA
(published
Jan.
6,
1974),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView?id=277.
81 Id.
82 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 488 U.S. at 180.
83 Tarkanian v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987).
84 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 488 U.S. at 182.
85 Id. at 195.
86 Id. at 199.
87 J. M. Schwartz, Recent Development: NCAA v. Tarkanian: State Action In Collegiate
Athletics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1703, 1709-10 (1989).
79
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schools for the enactment of the law.88 The NCAA challenged the law
based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, a corollary to the Commerce
Clause, which prevents a state from passing laws which unduly burden
interstate commerce.89 The NCAA won the case in the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, with Nevada’s state law being deemed
unconstitutional.90
Ironically, although the Supreme Court did not find the NCAA to be
a “state actor” in the Tarkanian case, it later reversed itself in a similar
case affecting high school athletics regulation. In Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA),91 the TSSAA
imposed recruiting violations on Brentwood Academy, a private high
school in the state.92 The Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that
the TSSAA was a “state actor” and thus violated Brentwood’s due
process rights.93 This case was distinguished from Tarkanian in that
TSSAA’s actions were authorized and regulated under state law and it
predominantly regulated public schools.94 This case established a
distinction between college and high school athletics.95
The growing importance of football revenues, and to a lesser extent
basketball, provided coaches with leverage to demand skyrocketing
salaries and other benefits which greatly increased schools’ budgets.96
Salaries for a handful of men’s basketball assistant coaches surpassed
levels that typically were more akin to head coaches and placed a strain
on resources for smaller schools looking to compete against schools
with greater revenues.97 In response, the NCAA attempted to rein in
overall expenditures on coaches’ salaries by establishing a category for
“restricted earnings coaches” which would be capped at $16,000 per
year.98 These restrictions were immediately met with an antitrust suit
from coaches impacted by the new rule claiming the new rules were a
restraint on trade. In Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Tenth

88

Id.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
92 Id. at 293.
93 Id. at 291.
94 Id. at 297-98.
95 Id.
96 See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-doesmoney-go (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
97 See NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last
visited July 1, 2021).
98 See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016, 1024 (10th Cir.
1998).
89
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Circuit ruled that such caps were not protected under the rule of reason
and did indeed place undue restraints on trade. 99
The biggest challenge to the NCAA, however, has been over a
decade in the making on how it classifies its student-athletes. As
schools’ athletic department budgets have grown exponentially, the
opportunities and benefits to players have not grown at the same rate.
These additional revenues have largely flowed into even higher coaches’
salaries and other department priorities such as facilities and
multimedia.100 Student-athlete benefits have expanded mainly in
reaction to bad publicity – such as players not being provided sufficient
food and nutrition – and legal challenges.101 The NCAA faced more
public scrutiny as its revenues continued to increase exponentially
while student-athletes did not see proportional increases in benefits.
In a progression that will transform college athletics, former UCLA
and NBA star Edward O’Bannon filed an antitrust suit in 2009 against
the NCAA. O’Bannon claimed that the NCAA engaged in unauthorized
use of student-athletes names, images, and likenesses in the
broadcasting of college sporting events and that they should be
compensated for such use after they graduate.102 While the plaintiffs
initially prevailed at the trial court level, the decision was partially
reversed on appeal.103 The U.S. Supreme court denied certiorari in
2016.104
A separate suit, Jenkins v. NCAA,105 challenged the NCAA’s financial
aid caps for student-athletes.106 These caps limited financial aid awards

99

Id. at 1016, 1024.
Dr. Kevin Blue, Rising Expenses in College Athletics and the Non‐Profit Paradox,
ATHLETIC DIRECTOR U,
https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/kevin-blue-risingexpenses-in-college-athletics-and-the-non-profit-paradox/ (last visited Apr. 7, 20201).
101 In response to a public outcry from comments made by University of Connecticut
star Shabazz Napier during the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament about
student-athletes not having enough food to eat some nights, the NCAA abruptly
amended its regulations to allow schools to provide unlimited meals. See Mike Singer,
Connecticut’s Shabazz Napier: ‘We do have hungry nights’, CBS (April 7, 2014),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/connecticuts-shabazz-napierwe-do-have-hungry-nights/.
102 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Jenkins v. NCAA), 958 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom; Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020), and cert. granted sub nom;
Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2020).
106 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Jenkins v. NCAA), 958 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom; Nat’l Collegiate
100
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to the value of tuition, room and board, and required fees at each
school.107 While the plaintiffs initially prevailed, the verdict was
rendered moot on appeal as the NCAA had already made some
concessions in their bylaws to provide for “full cost of attendance”
grants which provided student-athletes with allowances beyond the
challenged restrictions.108
The most recent legal challenge will likely be the most significant
as the U.S. Supreme Court has granted the NCAA’s petition for certiorari
in Alston v. NCAA.109 Plaintiffs in Alston claim that any caps on educationrelated benefits are unlawful restraints on trade, while the NCAA has
responded with its usual “rule of reason” defense. The Supreme Court
rendered its decision on June 21, 2021.110
While the NCAA suffered a major defeat in NCAA v. Board of
Regents in its ability to control television revenue unilaterally, the courts
have been more sympathetic to preserving the NCAA’s brand of
“amateurism.” Courts have been reluctant to find amateurism to be a
restraint on trade and violative of antitrust laws. An “amateur” is
generally defined as “one who engages in a pursuit, study, science, or
sport as a pastime rather than as a profession” or “one lacking in
experience and competence in an art or science.”111 However, the
NCAA’s definition of “amateurism” significantly expands the traditional
definition. Per the NCAA, the simple act of hiring an “agent” is sufficient
for a student-athlete to lose “amateur” status and violate the NCAA
principles regardless of whether the student-athlete actually earns any
compensation or is successful in garnering a professional contract.112 In
Banks v. NCAA,113 Braxton Banks, a standout football player for the
University of Notre Dame, challenged the NCAA’s amateurism

Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020), and cert. granted sub nom;
Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2020).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Dec. 16, 2020). Oral
arguments were heard on March 31, 2021.
110 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Et Al., Slip Opinion published
June
21,
2021.
See
US
Supreme
Court
Opinions:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/20.
111 “Amateur” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2021, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dicti.onary/amateur April 2021).
112 NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1 Use of Agents. An individual shall be ineligible for participation
in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or
reputation in that sport.
113 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
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requirements. 114 Before exhausting his NCAA eligibility, Banks took the
active step to make himself eligible for the 1990 NFL Draft and signed
with an agent to enhance his draft prospect.115 When he was not drafted
nor offered a contract with an NFL team, Banks petitioned the NCAA for
reinstatement so he could play out his final year of eligibility at Notre
Dame.116 After the NCAA refused to consider Banks’ request for
reinstatement, Banks filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA
claiming that their amateurism rules were an unlawful restraint on
trade.117 Both the district court and Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the
NCAA, finding that Banks failed to show that the NCAA’s rules were
anticompetitive.118

III. The Current Battleground: What are Rights of
Publicity?
A. NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS RIGHTS
Name, image, and likeness rights (NILs), often referred to as “rights
of publicity” or “rights of celebrity,” provide an individual with “the right
to control the commercial use of” their NILs, and any other unequivocal
aspect of one’s personality.119 Unlike most intellectual property claims,
the power to bring suit upon this right is not preempted by federal law.
In fact, most rights of publicity claims are brought under state statute or
common law.120 The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes four
categories of protected privacy rights: intrusion upon another’s
seclusion, misappropriation of a name or likeness, unreasonable or
unauthorized publicity, and false light.121
The phrase, “right of publicity,” was first introduced by Judge Frank
in his majority opinion for Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing

114

Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1084.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992).
119 Rights
of
Publicity,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/publicity. See generally Jonathan Faber, A Brief
History of the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/briefhistory-of-rop (last updated July 31, 2015) (discussing Indiana’s right of publicity
statute, which gives a property interest in an individual’s “distinctive appearance,
gestures [and] mannerisms.”).
120 See id. (explaining that some states have codified the common law right of
publicity).
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
115
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Gum, Inc.,122 which was a lawsuit that centered on the right to use a
baseball player’s photograph on baseball cards. 123 Judge Frank cited
false endorsement cases from the early 1900s that recognized an
individual’s right to control the use of their own likeness.124 In defining
this right, Judge Frank stated that:
[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e. the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture…This right
might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball players), far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money
for authoring advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains, and subways.125
Although Haelan Laboratories set a foundation for violations of
rights of publicity causes of action, rights of publicity claims were rarely
brought until the Supreme Court ruled on Zacchini v. Scripps‐Howard
Broadcasting Co.126 In its first major opinion examining the right of
publicity, the Supreme Court held that a news broadcasting company is
not necessarily protected by the first amendment when it uses a
performer’s likeness without authorization.127 Writing for the majority,
Justice White established a balancing test that weighs the societal value
established through a publisher’s first amendment usage of an
individual’s NILs and the individual’s own right to profit from the
exploitation of those rights.128
Later, the Sixth Circuit established in Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc.129 that the right to control one’s likeness includes
unlicensed use of “symbolic” mannerisms or catchphrases and that a
plaintiff only had to prove that a defendant generated an economic
benefit derived from unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s likeness.130
The right of publicity continued to expand until Comedy III v.
Saderup,131 where the Court held that a work may portray the likeness
of a public figure if the representation amounts to a transformative
122

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 867.
124 See id. at 868 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917); Madison
Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
127 See id. at 577-78.
128 Id.
129 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
130 Id. at 836.
131 See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (Cal. 2001).
123
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reinterpretation.132 Here, the Defendant’s “cutting and pasting” of the
public figure’s image to a T-Shirt violated the Plaintiff’s right of publicity,
but, its use in combination with other creative elements, transformed
the work as a whole into a new, protectable expression. 133
On the federal level, suits raising “rights of publicity” concerns
typically seek to establish a claim under the “false endorsement of
origin” claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.134 Unlike statebased right of publicity actions, 43(a) claims require a false or
misleading description or representation of fact which is likely to cause
confusion or to deceive about the affiliation or association of a person
with another person.135 This approach emphasizes the likelihood of
confusion in the origin of a work and, therefore, practically limit its’
application to well-known celebrities, while non-celebrities whose
likeness is misappropriated are limited to only right of publicity
claims.136 NFL Hall of Fame player Jim Brown unsuccessfully pursued
this strategy in his 2013 suit against Electronic Arts, Inc. where he raised
Lanham act claims against the use of his likeness in the company’s
popular Madden NFL series of video games. 137 Citing the “Rogers test”
in the case, 138 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling
finding that Brown had not alleged facts that satisfied either condition
to allow a § 43(a) claim to succeed under the Rogers test.139 Despite its
shortcomings in these cases, the Lanham Act claims can be used as a
forum selection issues by allowing plaintiffs to raise or strengthen
claims in jurisdictions where state rights of publicity statutes or
common law may not be not as favorable.140
Rights of publicity are not unique to sports, but rather provide a
broad cause of action to give individuals to decide how and by whom

132

Id. at 404.
Id. at 393, 395, 409.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1253, 1237 (9th Cir. 2013).
138 Recognizing the need to balance the public’s First Amendment interest in free
expression against the public’s interest in being free from consumer confusion about
affiliation and endorsement, the Second Circuit created the “Rogers test” in Rogers v.
Grimaldi. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). Under the Rogers test, § 43(a) will not be applied
to expressive works “unless the [use of the trademark or other identifying material] has
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the [use of trademark or other identifying material] explicitly misleads
as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. at 999.
139 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248.
140 Mark S. VanderBroek, Understanding False Endorsement and Right of Publicity
Claims in a Digital Age, Vol 73 No. 12, IɴᴛᴀBᴜʟʟᴇᴛɪɴ (July 15, 2018).
133
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their NILs can be exploited. The higher the “celebrity status” of an
individual, the greater the likelihood that exploitation or
misappropriation can impair the rightsholder’s economic interests.
B. THE CURRENT BATTLEGROUND: NCAA AND NIL RIGHTS
While the NCAA has been facing almost constant litigation from
student-athlete representatives on the antitrust claims against the
NCAA’s limits on scholarship numbers, amount of grants in aid, and
other claims invoking the restraints on the labor market for studentathletes competing in NCAA events, the NCAA is also battling on a new
front. Rather than attacking amateurism as a whole, as contemplated in
the antitrust cases, the effort to grant student-athletes the right to
capitalize on their NIL rights provides a narrower focus by separating
the issue of compensation for athletic participation – or employment –
from the right to earn compensation through other means through the
exploitation of their rights of publicity. However, the NCAA’s reluctance
to date has given rise to a tidal wave of state legislation has been
weaponized against it to allow players to otherwise circumvent NCAA
amateurism rules.
While the right of publicity provides an individual with the right to
control the commercialization rights of their own persona, the NCAA has
prohibited such opportunities as a violation of its Principle of
Amateurism. Per NCAA Bylaw 2.9, “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs
in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits
to be derived.141 Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation
by professional and commercial enterprises.”142 The NCAA steadfastly
leans on amateurism to eschew any compensation related to
commercial opportunities connected to a student-athlete’s athletic
participation.143

141

NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, at 3, (Aug. 1, 2020).
Id.
143 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Bylaw 12.5.2.1 at 77 (2019),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D120.pdf
(addressing
Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete and stating “after
becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible for participation in
intercollegiate athletics if the individual: (a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits
the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the
sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind; or(b) Receives remuneration
for endorsing a commercial product or service through the individual’s use of such
product or service”).
142
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With the courts upholding the NCAA’s ability to force athletes to
forgo outside compensation related to their athletic participation,
proponents for student-athletes chose a different strategy. Instead of
challenging amateurism in the courts, they instead turned to state
legislatures to undercut the NCAA’s ability to enforce restrictions
against a student-athlete’s ability to profit from their NILs. California
was the first state to pass legislation that enjoined the NCAA and its
member institutions from placing any limits on the ability of studentathletes to capitalize on their NIL rights.144 California’s Fair Play to Pay
Act made it the first state in the nation to enact legislation allowing
student athletes to capitalize from the use of their NILs and earn
compensation.145 The law allows all student athletes enrolled in public
and private four-year colleges and universities in California to hire
agents to assist in generating revenue from their rights of publicity and
to seek out these revenue opportunities without the fear of losing their
NCAA eligibility or scholarships. California colleges were also barred
from enforcing NCAA amateurism rules that prevent student-athletes
from earning such compensation as well as restricting the NCAA from
disqualifying California universities from intercollegiate sports for
violating the NCAA’s amateurism rules in this regard.146 The California
law, however, provided a window for the NCAA to react to the legislation
by delaying the effective date until January 1, 2023.147 Other states did
not provide the NCAA with that same luxury. Florida’s law is set to take
effect on July 1, 2021, providing the NCAA with only a limited window
to react to the new law.148 New Jersey, Colorado, and Nebraska also
passed similar legislation creating a complex compliance environment
144 Press Release, Office of the Governor Gavin Newsom, Governor Newsom Signs SB
206, Taking on Long-Standing Power Imbalance in College Sports (Sept. 30, 2019)
(available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/09/30/governor-newsom-signs-sb-206taking-on-long-standing-power-imbalance-in-college-sports/).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Dan Murphy, Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill now a Law; State Athletes can
Profit from Endorsements Next Summer, ENT. & SPORTS PROGRAMMING NETWORK (June 20,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-nameimage-likeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletes-profit-endorsements-nextsummer.
148 Press Release, The Fla. Senate, Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation & Rights
Legislation Signed Into Law (June 12, 2020) (on file with author at
https://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressRelease/Show/3557) (discussing Florida’s
legislation concerning the state name, image, likeness bill now a law, which would allow
state athletes to profit from endorsements next summer); Dan Murphy, Florida Name,
Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes Can Profit From Endorsements Next
Summer,
ENT.
&
SPORTS
PROGRAMMING
NETWORK
(June
20,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-imagelikeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletes-profit-endorsements-next-summer.
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with varying legal provisions and effective dates across the country.149
The NCAA quickly assembled its own legislation to amend its rules to
comply with the emerging state laws,150 although the NCAA changed
those plans when the US Department of Justice voiced concern that the
proposed NCAA rules would potentially trigger antitrust laws.151 The
NCAA then looked to Congress to pass legislation to preempt these new
state laws.
On the federal level, elected officials have also jockeyed amongst
themselves to capitalize on the popularity of supporting studentathletes with their legislative proposals. Senators Cory Booker (D-N.J.)
and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) introduced an athlete-friendly bill,
dubbed the “College Athletes Bill of Rights,” which would introduce
professional league-styled revenue sharing, group licensing, lifetime
education benefits, and other player benefits at the expense of the NCAA.
152
The Booker-Blumenthal bill also focuses predominantly on
providing relief to men’s football and basketball players.153 The bill
ignores the existing redistributive properties in the NCAA that fund
other sports, male and female. While celebrated by football and
basketball players, it is probably the least administrable and most
disruptive bill to the current realities and constraints of the NCAA.
Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced his own competing

149 Press Release, Insider NJ, ‘New Jersey Fair Play Act’ Signed Into Law (Sept. 14,
2020) (on file with author at https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/new-jerseyfair-play-act-signed-law/); Steve Berkowitz, Colorado Governor Signs College Athlete
Name,
Image
and
Likeness
Bill,
USA
TODAY
(Mar.
20,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/03/20/colorado-governorsigns-college-athlete-name-image- likeness-bill/2887481001/; Press Release, Neb.
Legislature,
(July
21,
2020)
(on
file
with
author
at
http://news.legislature.ne.gov/dist08/2020/07/21/press-release-legislature-passesthe-nebraska-fair-pay-to-play-act/).
150 DI Council Introduces Name, Image and Likeness Concepts into Legislative Cycle,
NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N:
Media
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-introducesname-image-and-likeness-concepts-legislative-cycle.
151 Lilah Burke, NCAA to Delay Name, Image and Likeness Vote After DOJ Letter, INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/11/ncaa-delay-name-imageand-likeness-vote-after-doj-letter.
152 Ross Dellenger, Inside the Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights Being
Introduced
in
Congress,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Dec.
17,
2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/17/athlete-bill-of-rights-congress-ncaafootball
153 Id.
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legislation,154 which the NCAA endorsed.155 This rival bill to the
Booker/Blumenthal measure supports student-athlete NIL rights but
also provides some antitrust protections for the NCAA, thus making the
likelihood of a quick resolution in a fiercely partisan Congress unlikely.
While the concept of amateurism is noble in theory, it fails to
appreciate the reality of today’s college sports landscape. Cable
networks frequently telecast Division I football and basketball games,
which generate hundreds of millions of dollars in broadcast revenues.156
Schools spend significant resources on multimedia and public relations
to engage fans and grow not only their own brand, but also the brand of
their student-athletes as a by-product of their success. Many college
athletes have greater name recognition and commercial earning
potential than not only other professional athletes, but also local
congresspersons, experts in their fields, and even many television or
film actors and actresses.
NILs present a unique opportunity to capitalize on the platform
that the sports industry presents. Student-athletes also have the
opportunity to create their own fame. For example, Donald De La Haye
has been deemed ineligible as an NCAA player because of the money he
has made off of his YouTube videos.157 As a backup kicker on the
University of Central Florida football team, De La Haye gained a sizable
following on YouTube for a series of videos that he created chronicling
the life of a backup kicker in major college football.158 Based on current
NCAA rules, he was forced to decide whether to monetize his videos and
gain revenue or remain an amateur under the NCAA’s definition and
forego the revenue opportunities.159 Modern technology and social
media allows student-athletes to amass large followings that become
attractive to corporate marketers looking to utilize their influence. The
De La Haye case shows that marketability does not need to be tied to
154 Ralph D. Russo, Florida Sen. Rubio Introduces NIL bill to Push NCAA Changes,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
June
18,
2020,
https://apnews.com/article/7d9e67592f2e2b34eb3445f004233315.
155 NCAA Statement on Sen. Marco Rubio Bill, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N: Media
(June 18, 2020), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaastatement-sen-marco-rubio-bill.
156 Jordan James, Report: SEC TV Deal will Increase School Payouts by $20 Million,
247SPORTS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://247sports.com/college/auburn/Article/SECcollege-football-TV-contract-CBS-ESPN-ABC-revenue-140925524/.
157 Chuck Schilken, Central Florida Kicker Donald De La Haye Loses his NCAA Eligibility
because
of
his
YouTube
Videos,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
01,
2017),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/more/la-sp-ucf-kicker-ineligible-youtube20170801-story.html.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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athletic success, but rather the name recognition and notoriety of
becoming a “celebrity.”
The “celebrity factor” that is the root of the current battle on the
NIL front is a classic “chicken and egg” problem. The NCAA has
traditionally eschewed student-athletes of any athletics-related
revenue opportunities while simultaneously promoting many of these
same student-athletes to celebrity status. Many sports fans revered
names such as Tim Tebow, Zion Williamson, and Trevor Lawrence well
before they even progressed past their freshman years in college. The
NCAA fears that the dollar signs in the eyes of seventeen and eighteenyear-old prospects will greatly undermine the recruiting process and
further skew the competitive landscape.160 Yet this fear bears little
difference to the current recruiting landscape, where sports facilities
are the most common mediums for luring top prospects. High profile
recruiting scandals at both the University of Tennessee’s football team
and University of Louisville’s basketball team illustrate only the latest
examples of the corruption, money, and violative actions taken by
schools, boosters, and coaches to garner success on the field. 161
Allowing players to harness the value of their personal brands allows
these actions to come above board and be tracked. But this approach
does not fit well with the NCAA’s typical “command and control”
regulatory model. The NCAA fears that once NIL restrictions are lifted,
they will never be able to be controlled again since such restrictions
would then curtail economic interests and conflict with antitrust
laws.162 At least right now, the NCAA has the veil of amateurism to hide
behind in issuing its regulations.
Player advocates have pursued the “states first” strategy on the
legislative front and targeted labor-friendly states such as California and
New Jersey and other states, such as Florida, where college athletics

160 See Ross Dellenger, With Recruiting in Mind, States Jockey to One‐Up Each Other in
Chaotic Race for NIL Laws, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (March 4, 2021),
https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/04/name-image-likeness-state-laws-congressncaa.
161 Adam Sparks, Tennessee Football’s Violations were Level I and Level II: Here’s What
that Means, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (last updated January 19, 2021),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/college/vols/2021/01/18/tennesseevols-football-ncaa-violations-jeremy-pruitt-firing/4207318001/;
Ben
Kercheval,
Louisville Basketball Receives NCAA Notice of Allegations in Connection with FBI Investigation, CBS
SPORTS (May 4, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/louisville-basketballreceives-ncaa-notice-of-allegations-in-connection-with-fbi-investigation/.
162 Lilah Burke, NCAA to Delay Name, Image and Likeness Vote After DOJ Letter, INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(January
11,
2021),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/11/ncaa-delay-name-imageand-likeness-vote-after-doj-letter.
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carry disproportionate importance. This strategy forced the NCAA to
act.163 The state-based approach, however, is hugely problematic.
Unlike legislation promoted through the Uniform Laws Commission
(ULC), this approach is haphazard and divergent from one state to the
other and therefore lacks uniformity. Further, this approach places
unique limitations on schools based on the states in which they reside.
A state such as University of Florida can have very different standards
than its neighbor, the University of Georgia; yet, the two schools play
each other every season. While the “states first” strategy has proven to
be successful in gaining market-share for the legislation, the patchwork
nature of state laws to regulate a national sports enterprise is bound for
unwieldy complexity and, ultimately, failure.

IV. Where Does the NCAA Go From Here?
Granting players with the opportunity to capitalize on their NIL
rights is the easy answer for the NCAA. It essentially allows studentathletes to control their own revenue potential without costing NCAA
schools anything by allowing the athletes to remain amateur athletes
and non-employees. The NCAA’s paternalistic tendencies were pushing
the organization to implement a rigid framework and “police” NIL deals
until the Department of Justice stepped in. The NCAA’s desire to prevent
manipulation of NIL deals for recruiting benefits ignores the skewed
recruiting landscape that already exists. Many industry watchers
believe such measures will lead to disaster and consequently alienate
the NCAA from key members and move the organization beyond a point
of no return. Instead, the NCAA would be better served by imposing a
moratorium on its own restrictions and allowing the NIL rights market
to develop before looking at how to control it. Existing bylaws already
provide a safety net for some of the negative behavior the NCAA tries to
control and would not need to be discarded in their entirety.
Meanwhile, Congress must enact legislation to bring common
sense to college athletics. Unlike professional leagues where players
and management collectively bargain and have mutual interests, college
athletics is a unique enterprise that needs oversight and guardrails
163 See Dan Murphy, Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes can
Profit
from
Endorsements
Next
Summer,
ESPN
(June
12,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-imagelikeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletes-profit-endorsements-next-summer; see
also PRESS RELEASE, Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation & Rights Legislation Signed Into
Law,
FLA.
S.
(June
12,
2020),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressRelease/Show/3557.
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against itself. Left to its own devices, the NCAA has proven it lacks
responsiveness and flexibility by taking often zealous stances to
emerging issues. Secondly, the NCAA’s authority itself has been
increasingly challenged by its membership, as depicted in the academic
scandal at the University of North Carolina and the sexual abuse
incidents at both Penn State and Michigan State. 164 The NCAA’s strict
adherence to amateurism despite the tremendous explosion of
technological innovation and multimedia has alienated others as well.
More important than regulating NILs, the NCAA’s primary interest
is protecting amateurism. Amateurism allows NCAA schools to still
consider their student-athletes as students, not employees, and
therefore continue to escape wages, benefits, and other compensation
due to employees. This conversion of amateur athletes to employment
status would be far more devastating for the NCAA than permitting
student-athletes to solicit and capitalize on their own efforts to market
their NILs. Classifying student-athletes as employees would force
schools to actually compensate athletes beyond scholarships and the
“soft” group benefits, such as enhanced educational opportunities,
academic support, and other collective benefits at each school. In
addition to the cost of wages and taxes, it would also subject the schools
to a host of other employment laws and regulations and likely lead to
collective bargaining at some point. If the NCAA’s goal is to preserve a
level playing field for the breadth of the schools that are competing
within its framework, then it is actually in its best interests to allow
student-athletes to harness the power of their platforms.
In the Northwestern football players’ attempt to unionize in
2014,165 the NCAA was steadfastly concerned that recognizing the
football players as a union and establishing student-athletes as
employees, would undermine their status as amateur – not professional
– athletes and thus places the employment burdens on schools
themselves.166 Federal and state laws maintain very clear standards in
the classification of workers, but mainly between employees and

164 See Greg Barnes, UNC Response Challenges NCAA Missteps, 247SPORTS.COM (Aug. 4,
2016), https://247sports.com/college/north-carolina/board/102714/Contents/uncresponse-challenges-ncaa-missteps-71286851/; Dennis Dodd, After its Penn State
Failures, NCAA Must Get it Right with Larry Nassar, Michigan State, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 24,
2018),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/after-its-penn-statefailures-ncaa-must-get-it-right-with-larry-nassar-michigan-state/.
165 See generally, Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in Northwestern
Case, NLRB.GOV: NEWS AND PUBLICATIONS (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/news-story/board-unanimously-decides-to-decline-jurisdiction-innorthwestern-case.
166 Id.
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independent contractors.167 Control is typically the main differentiator
as employers are able to exercise the greatest amount of control over
their employees while independent contractors retain more flexibility
and independence in providing services to their client-employers.168
Similar difficulties previously existed in the classification of graduate
research assistants at universities where they share responsibilities of
an employee and a student, but under the direction of supervising
professors.169
For student-athletes, they are under the tight control of coaches
who regulate their practice schedules, meetings, nutrition, and even
their academic schedules to fit into the needs of the team. Scholarships
are controlled by the coaches as well and can be terminated or extended
based on the coaches’ goals and objectives in building their rosters – or
workforce. Ironically, classification of student-athletes as employees
would provide the NCAA member schools with the greatest level of
control over their athletes – including the regulation of their NILs in a
manner consistent with their employment – but it would impose the
burden of employees on the universities.
Approving NILs for student-athletes is the easy answer for the
NCAA as it would not force a change in employment classification. It
allows the student-athletes to become their own entrepreneurs and
control their own NIL rights without costing the NCAA schools anything.
It is true that some student-athletes will prosper while others will not
see as much benefit; however, this self-control absolves the NCAA of the
responsibility of monitoring this system. Instead of preserving the
“communistic” system of ensuring that all student-athletes receive the
same direction financial compensation (namely, zero), it would allow
the NCAA to be more capitalistic and allow student-athletes to control
their own destiny.
Lastly, the NCAA must shift its mindset from the “command and
control” regulatory environment to a self-regulatory environment,
possibly with federal government oversight to provide it with great
investigative authority to regulate abuses. There is precedent for
government oversight and monitoring of private, self-regulatory

167 IRS, PUBLICATION 15-A, EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE: WHO ARE EMPLOYEES?
(2021), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15a#en_US_2021_publink1000169466.
168 Id.
169 “As of March 15, 2021, the proposed NLRB rule published on September 23, 2019,
at 84 FR 49691, and corrected on October 16, 2019, at 84 FR 55265, is withdrawn.”
Jurisdiction-Nonemployee Status of University and College Students Working in
Connection With Their Studies, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,297 (March 15, 2021) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 103).
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organizations.170 This model has been the basis of regulation in the
financial industry for decades where organizations such as the New
York Stock Exchange, FINRA, and others have been granted regulatory
authority to police themselves with government oversight of their
activities.171 These organizations do maintain tight rules on their
membership with oversight from the Securities and Exchange
Commission. This approach would be a powerful step in bringing
credibility back to the NCAA and allowing it to function more effectively.
It allows the NCAA to set the guard rails for the process of regulating the
impacts of the proposed NILs while having federal oversight to prevent
abuses and ensure the NCAA is true to its mission.

170

What is a Self‐Regulatory Organization (SRO)?, CORP. FIN. INST. (last accessed Apr.
6, 2021), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/other/selfregulatory-organization-sro/.
171 Id.

